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I. INTRODUCTION*
In December 1963 Studebaker Corporation announced the closing
of its South Bend, Indiana automotive manufacturing plant and the
termination of the plant's pension benefit plan. Because of contractual
termination priorities, only 3,600 retirees and employees who had
reached the retirement age of sixty received their full benefits. Four
thousand other employees aged forty through fifty-nine, who had at
least ten years of service, received only fifteen percent of the actuarial
value of their accrued pension benefits. The remaining 2,900 unfortu-
nate workers, who were either under the age of forty or had completed
less than ten years of service with Studebaker, received nothing.1
The benefits plan had been seriously underfunded, leaving
thousands of workers, many middle-aged and unable to find other em-
ployment, to face a forced retirement without the benefits they had
been promised.
Over the next decade Congress waded through hearings, studies,
and voluminous proposed legislation in an effort to alleviate the Draco-
nian effect of failed or abused employee pension and benefit plans. In
1971 the Senate Labor Subcommittee heard the testimony of a succes-
sion of workers in their late forties and fifties who told of losing their
pension rights because of layoffs, plant shut-downs, transfers, and bus-
iness closings. One witness had worked for one company for thirty-two
years and was laid off three years before he became eligible for his
pension.2 After countless "horror stories" and on the crest of a wave of
public and media demand for congressional action, Congress enacted
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or the
Act). Congressional intent to alleviate employee benefit plan abuse
through federal regulation is clear from the Act's declaration of public
policy:
[D]espite the enormous growth in [employee benefit] plans many em-
* Thanks to Elizabeth A. Carpentier, Sinkler & Boyd, P.A., Columbia, South
Carolina, for her time and patience in introducing the author to the Act and underlying
concepts.
Special thanks to David C. Cleveland and to the legal staff of Farm Credit Bank of
Columbia for their support of this project.
1. J. LANGBERN & B. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 53-58 (1990).
2. See id. at 65.
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ployees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retire-
ment benefits owing to the lack of [sufficient vesting, funding, and
termination provisions]. . . .[I]t is therefore desirable. . . that min-
imum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such
plans and their financial soundness. 3
One feature of ERISA that makes the Act so sweeping is a
broadly-construed preemption clause, which enables ERISA to pre-
empt state actions that involve ERISA-governed plans.4 There are, of
course, exceptions to preemption. Because of the ramifications of pre-
emption, prolific litigation has arisen concerning the interpretation and
application of those exceptions. One of the more widely litigated excep-
tions is one in which actions based on state laws that regulate insur-
ance are saved from preemption. 5 These cases deal primarily with cri-
teria for determining when state laws "regulate insurance" for the
purposes of the Act. The most recent opinions address the preemption
of state bad-faith actions and issues surrounding fiduciary aspects of
the Act.
This Note examines recent case law, statutory provisions, and leg-
islative history with regard to saving state insurance regulation laws
from preemption, and then applies the relevant analyses and tests to
South Carolina law. The Note begins with an overview of ERISA and
an examination of the interaction between the preemption, saving, and
deeming clauses. It then explores the reasoning and analysis of the ju-
diciary that interprets and applies this legislation. Finally, by applying
the determining factors to South Carolina law, this Note will attempt
to determine which state actions, if any, would be saved from
preemption.
II. THE ACT
A. Affected Plans
ERISA regulates two categories of employee benefit plans: pension
plans and employee welfare benefit plans." This Note focuses on wel-
fare benefit plans because they are more frequently the subject of liti-
gation. Although the Act uses the terms "benefit plan" and "employee
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1988).
4. Id. § 1144(a).
5. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
6. Pension plans are those established to provide employees with retirement or
deferred income. Id. § 1002(2)(A). Welfare benefit plans provide medical, accident, disa-
bility, death or unemployment, vacation, or training benefits. Id. § 1002(1).
1991]
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benefit plan" to refer to both pension and welfare benefit plans,7 these
terms generally will refer only to welfare benefit plans in this Note.
Under 29 U.S.C. § 1002,8 a regulated plan is one that is established
and maintained by an employer to provide welfare or pension benefits
to employees.9 ERISA does not regulate governmental plans,10 church
plans,1 or plans established solely for the purpose of complying with
workers' compensation, unemployment, or disability insurance laws.'2
Aside from small group plans (fewer than 20 employees), which are
exempt from COBRA' 3 requirements, all plans other than those cited
are subject to ERISA regulation.
Unlike its treatment of pension plans, ERISA does not address the
substantive terms of welfare plans.14 ERISA confines its regulation of
welfare plans to procedural and administrative aspects and establishes
certain fiduciary duties. The substantive content of some welfare bene-
fit plans may be influenced by state law.' 5 ERISA also contains tax
provisions which are designed, in part, to create incentives for provid-
ing and participating in benefit plans. This Note will focus on the Act's
labor provisions and will not address the tax issues.
B. Standing to Litigate and ERISA Remedies
A participant 6 or beneficiary 1 can sue under ERISA: (1) to com-
7. Id. § 1002(3).
8. (1988). An "employer" is any person acting directly as an employer or indi-
rectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan; this in-
cludes a group or association of employers acting for an employer in such a capacity. Id.
§ 1002(5).
9. "'[E]mployee' means any individual employed by an employer." Id. § 1002(6).
10. Id. § 1003(b)(1). A governmental plan is one established by federal, state, or
local government for its employees. Id. § 1002(32).
11. Id. § 1003(b)(2). A church plan is one established by a church or religious 'or-
ganization for its employees, or by an association of churches exempt from taxes under
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501 (1988). 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33) (1988).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988).
13. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, parts of which are codified
in ERISA at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988).
14. Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
15. Id. at 729-33.
16. ERISA defines participant as:
[A]ny employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive
a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of
such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988).
17. Beneficiary means "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id. §
[Vol. 42
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pel a plan administrator to make certain disclosures,18 to recover bene-
fits, enforce rights under the plan, or clarify future rights;" (2) to ob-
tain appropriate relief for breach of fiduciary duty;20 (3) to enjoin any
practice that is contrary to the Act or the terms of the plan, to obtain
relief from such contradictory practices or to enforce any provisions of
the Act or the plan;21 and (4) to enforce disclosure to the beneficiary of
reports made to the Internal Revenue Service.2 2 The Secretary of La-
bor has standing in actions described in (2) and (4) above. In addition
to these possible actions, the Secretary of Labor may sue to enjoin any
violation of ERISA23 or to collect civil penalties.2 ' A fiduciary of a plan
has standing to bring an action under section 1132(a)(3) to enjoin any
act that violates ERISA, to obtain appropriate relief from the viola-
tion, or to enforce any provision of the Act or the plan.
ERISA remedies differ from those allowed by South Carolina law.
Under the Act, a court can award either party attorneys' fees with no
statutory cap on the amount.25 Under South Carolina law, only the in-
sured can get attorneys' fees and a cap on fees exists.2 Another dis-
tinction is that courts generally will limit claims for benefits under
ERISA to the terms of the plan.2 7 This contrasts with South Carolina
laws that allow extracontractual and punitive damages upon a showing
of certain elements, such as bad faith.28 The general rule under the Act
is that punitive damages are not recoverable.29 This latter difference
arguably provides less incentive for violators to comply with the Act
and is a factor in pro-saving arguments.
1002(8). For the purposes of this Note, "participant" and "beneficiary" are used
interchangeably.
18. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(A).
19. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
20. Id. § 1132(a)(2).
21. Id. § 1132(a)(3).
22. Id. § 1132(a)(4).
23. Id. § 1132(a)(5).
24. Id. § 1132(a)(6).
25. Id. § 1132(g).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
27. Section 1132 specifically permits a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits
due under the terms of a plan and permits participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries to
enjoin ERISA violations and obtain appropriate equitable relief.
28. See, e.g., Robertsen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 464 F. Supp. 876, 883
(D.S.C. 1979).
29. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
1991)
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C. Preemption of State Law
1. The Preemption Clause
When Congress drafted ERISA, it intended to eliminate the abuse
and failure of benefit plans by imposing a uniform standard to which
all plans must conform.30 To ensure this uniformity, Congress deemed
it necessary to limit regulation of such plans to federal law.3 1 To
achieve this, the drafters incorporated a preemption clause, 29 U.S.C. §
1144.32 This powerful clause was modeled after section 301 of the La-
bor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA). 3
Section 1144 provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection
(b)3 4 of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter
III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. . . not
exempt under section 1003(b) . . .,35
Courts have liberally interpreted this clause to give it wide-reach-
ing effect. The term "state laws" should be construed broadly to in-
clude statutes, case law, rules, regulations, and other state actions.36
Furthermore, the term "state" includes a state, its political subdivi-
sions, and all agencies or instrumentalities of either.37 The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the words "relating to" to in-
clude laws whose only effect on ERISA-governed plans is indirect or
consequential. This provision has swept away conflicting state ac-
tions. Representative Dent, a drafter of ERISA, referred to this as "the
30. Congress clearly revealed its intention to eliminate employee benefit abuse in
ERISA's declaration of public policy. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
31. "It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the
substantive and enforcement provisions ... are intended to preempt the field for Fed-
eral regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local
regulation of employee benefit plans." H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 29,933
(1974) (statement of Senator Williams).
32. (1988).
33. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 301, 61 Stat.
136 (1947), amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
Pub, L. No, 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197
(1988)).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 40-44.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). Section 1003(b), cited in the text, exempts govern-
mental and church plans, which are maintained to comply with workers' compensation
or unemployment compensation laws, maintained outside of the United States for non-
resident aliens, and are excess benefit plans.
36. See, e.g., id. § 1144(c)(1).
37. Id, § 1144(c)(2).
38. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983).
[Vol. 42
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crowning achievement of this legislation .... ,,39
2. The Saving Clause
The drafters tempered this preemption power by enacting a "sav-
ing clause." It precludes ERISA preemption of certain state and fed-
eral laws. This clause provides that the preemption clause shall not
apply to:
(1) causes of action arising before January 1, 1975,40
(2) any law of any state which regulates insurance, banking or
securities,
41
(3) any generally applicable criminal law of a state,
42
(4) specified aspects of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act,43 and
(5) any state law mandating that employee benefit plans not include
certain provisions, to the extent that such state law is mandatory in
order for the state to comply with title XIX of the Social Security
Act.44
In contrast to the preemption clause, which has been construed liber-
ally, courts have very narrowly and strictly applied the saving clause.
45
Most litigation that involves the saving clause centers around the
exception for state laws that regulates insurance. Although the lan-
guage seems simple, the resulting litigation and judicial interpretation
of the clause have been complex.
3. The Deemer Clause
To modify the insurance exception of the saving clause, Congress
incorporated a "deemer clause." This clause provides that:
Neither an employee benefit plan ... nor any trust established under
such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be en-
gaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law
of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies. 48
39. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 29,179 (1974) (statement of Repre-
sentative Dent).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (1988).
41. Id. § 1144(b)(2).
42. Id. § 1144(b)(4).
43. Id. § 1144(b)(5).
44. Id. § 1144(b)(8).
45. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 745-46 (1985).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988).
1991]
7
Cleveland: ERISA Preemption: As the Federal Courts Identify the Outer Bounda
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ERISA treats insured47 and uninsured 8 plans very differently because
of this clause and these differences will be discussed in the next section
of this Note.
4. Interaction of the Preemption, Saving, and Deemer Clauses
Courts apply a three-part test in which all three parts must be
satisfied to determine whether ERISA preempts a state action. The
court determines (1) whether the state action "relates to" an employee
benefit plan, (2) whether the state law regulates insurance,49 and (3)
whether the deemer clause should be given effect. The deemer clause
deems that employee benefit plans are not insurers or insurance com-
panies for the purposes of ERISA. Therefore, the court must deter-
mine whether the state law legitimately regulates the business of insur-
ance or only regulates an employee benefit plan. 0
The Act distinguishes between insured and uninsured plans. Be-
cause the state may regulate the independent insurer, the state may
regulate some aspects of an insured plan. This is significant because
participants in insured plans may have state remedies that are not
available to participants in self-insured plans."1 The application of this
three-part test is complex because its application hinges on the mean-
ing of language such as "relate to" and "regulate insurance."
47. An insured plan provides benefits through the purchase of an insurance policy.
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732.
48. An uninsured or self-insured plan is one that insures or funds itself. Id.
49. The Act also saves state laws as discussed supra in text accompanying notes
40-44. This Note focuses only on state laws that regulate insurance.
50. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 741.
51. Id. at 747. The Court stated that the distinction made between insured and
uninsured plans was created by Congress in the deemer clause. In FMC Corp. v. Hol-
liday, 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990), the Court clarified that this distinction extends to all state
insurance regulations and not only to those that are specifically designed to affect em-
ployee benefit plans.
[Vol. 42
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III. CASE LAW
A. Pre- Pilot Life Interpretations
1. State Laws That Relate to an Employee Benefit Plan: The
Meaning of "Relate To"
a. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.52
Alessi provides the best starting place for an investigation of the
meaning of "relate to" for several reasons. First, Alessi was the Su-
preme Court's first analysis of ERISA's preemption clause, and its
holding laid the groundwork for following cases. Second, the facts in
Alessi make it a simple case in that the law in question directly con-
flicted with ERISA provisions, making it easy for the Court to apply
preemption. Finally, the Court's unanimous decision to affirm the
Third Circuit makes interpretation and application easier. 3
When Congress enacted ERISA, it was common for employers to
offset benefits due under employee plans by other payments such as
social security benefits and railroad retirement benefits. Although the
Act placed limits on such offsets, it did not prohibit them. By main-
taining the "integration method"5' of calculating pension benefits,
Congress allowed plans to limit the total maintenance funds received
by an individual to reduce plan costs.55 Alessi arose against this
backdrop.
The plaintiffs in Alessi were retiree-participants in pension benefit
plans.5 ' The plans provided that pensions paid to retirees were to be
offset by funds received from workers' compensation claims via the in-
tegration method.5 This litigation originated in New Jersey, however,
where state workers' compensation statutes expressly prohibited any
offsets for payments received pursuant to the statute .5 The plaintiffs
contended that (1) the plans' offsetting practices violated state law, 59
and (2) because the state law was one that regulated workers' compen-
sation rather than employee benefit plans, it did not "relate to" the
52. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
53. J. LANGBERN & B. WOLK, supra note 1, at 373.
54. Integration is a "calculation practice under which benefit levels are determined
by combining pension funds with other income streams available to the retired employ-
ees . .. ." Id. at 370.
55. Id.
56. 451 U.S. at 508.
57. Id. at 514.
58. Id. at 508.
59. Id.
1991]
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plan for purposes of preemption. The plaintiffs also argued that the
offset constituted a forfeiture that contravened the Act's nonforfeiture
provisions.
6 1
The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument, stating that "[i]t is of
no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly, through a workers'
compensation law, rather than directly, through a statute called 'pen-
sion regulation.' ERISA makes clear that even indirect state action
bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive
federal concern.
6 2
The Alessi Court spoke only about situations in which the state
law directly contradicted ERISA provisions.13 As a result, the argu-
ment remained that if the state law at issue did not contradict the
terms of the Act, it fell outside the realm of preemption. The Court did
not define the outer boundary of "relate to" until Shaw v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc.
6 4
b. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
In Shaw several airlines and other employers sued for a declara-
tory judgment that ERISA preempted New York's Human Rights Law,
which prohibited employers from discriminating on the basis of age,
race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, or marital status.6 " A
New York case had held that a private employer's employee benefit
plan which treated pregnancy differently from other nonoccupational
disabilities was discriminatory for the purposes of the New York stat-
ute.6 6 The employers in that action argued unsuccessfully that the case
related to employee benefit plans and that the state law pertaining to
employee benefit plans, the Disability Benefits Law, therefore, pre-
empted New York's Human Rights Law.6 1
The Shaw Court held that a law "'relates to' an employee benefit
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan."68 Justice Blackmun delivered the Court's
60. Id. at 524-25.
61. Id. at 508. The district court judges concluded that the offsets based on work-
ers' compensation awards would be forfeitures that were forbidden under § 1053 of the
Act. J. LANGBERN & B. WOLK, supra note 1, at 370.
62. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981).
63. Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith: Only Congress Can Save Us After Pi-
lot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1343, 1358 (1988).
64. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
65. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.1 (McKinney 1982).
66. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88.
67. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41
N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976).
68. 463 U.S. at 96-97.
[Vol. 42
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opinion. He pointed to a dictionary definition of "relate'"89 and to legis-
lative history as indicating Congressional intent to preempt state laws
such as the one in question. The opinion noted: "The bill that became
ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption clause, applicable
only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA.
'7 0
It further noted that because Congress rejected those provisions in
favor of the present preemption provisions, the Court believed that
Congress intended a broad preemptive scope.
After Shaw, state law was preempted if it merely had an indirect
effect on employee benefit plans. Although the Court addressed and
rejected a saving clause theory in Shaw,7 21 it did not interpret the in-
surance saving clause.
2. The Meaning of "Regulate Insurance"
a. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts
7 2
Although the Court defined the meaning of "relate to" in Shaw, it
did not define the meaning of the saving clause as it related to state
insurance regulation. The language of the clause states that state laws
which regulate insurance are saved from preemption.7 3 This becomes
complicated when one attempts to determine exactly which laws regu-
late insurance. In Metropolitan Life the Court established tests for
making this determination.
In Metropolitan Life the appellant insurance company contended
that ERISA preempted a Massachusetts statute which required certain
minimum mental health care benefits to be provided under any general
insurance policy, accident or sickness policy, or employee health-care
plan that covered hospital and surgical expenses. 74 Clearly, the statute
was a state law that related to employee benefit plans. The question
remained whether ERISA's "regulate insurance" clause saved it from
preemption.
The Court used a two-part test to determine that the Massachu-
setts mental health law was one that regulated insurance within the
meaning of ERISA's saving clause. Step One consisted of a "common
sense" approach: because mandated benefit laws regulated the terms of
69. Id. at 97 n.16. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979).
70. Id. at 98.
71. Note, supra note 63, at 1360 n.126.
72. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988) ("nothing in this subchapter shall be con-
strued to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any state which regulates insur-
ance . . ").
74. 471 U.S. at 727.
1991]
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insurance policies, these laws obviously regulated insurance.75 Step
Two integrated factors from case law that interpreted the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,7 6 which explicitly conferred upon states the power to
regulate insurance. This step itself was a three-part test. To determine
whether a practice involved the "business of insurance," the Court had
to determine that (1) the practice or law transferred or spread policy-
holder risk, (2) the practice or law affected an integral part of the in-
surer-insured relationship, and (3) the practice or law was limited to
entities within the insurance business. 77 The Court adopted this test
from the earlier McCarran-Ferguson cases, which held that when those
three factors indicated that a practice regulated insurance, the practice
was subject to state rather than federal regulation.7 8 The Supreme
Court, by analogy, believed these factors indicated whether a law or
practice constituted insurance regulation for the purposes of ERISA's
saving clause.
The first factor considers the transfer of risk. An insurance law or
practice generally transfers policyholder risk if it manipulates or reallo-
cates risk so that low-risk beneficiaries, by paying increased premiums
for the coverage, carry part of the potential risk for high-risk benefi-
ciaries. By mandating that all health insurance policies provide mini-
mum mental health benefits, the Massachusetts law forced the low-risk
participants to become a part of the risk pool, thereby spreading the
risk over a higher number of participants. 9
The second fa-tor considers whether the law or practice is an inte-
gral part of the insurer-insured relationship. Interpreting and applying
the McCarran-Ferguson Act in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v.
Pireno,80 the Court established that a law or practice which affects the
insurer-insured relationship is one that, among other things, regulates
the type of policy that could be issued.8 1 Thus, the Metropolitan Life
Court reasoned that by determining the type of insurance policy that
could be provided, the Massachusetts statute touched an integral part
of the insurer-insured relationship.
82
The third factor considers whether the law or practice applies only
to entities within the insurance industry. The Metropolitan Life Court
reasoned that because the benefits granted to insurance entities by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act did not extend to entities outside of the insur-
75. Id. at 740.
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
77. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-43.
78. Id. at 743.
79. Id.
80. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
81. Note, supra note 63, at 1364 n.156.
82. Id.
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ance industry, a law or practice did not regulate insurance under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act if it extended to entities not solely within the
insurance business. Consequently, the Court determined that a law
must regulate only entities within the insurance business to be saved
from ERISA preemption. The Court also decided that the Massachu-
setts legislature had intended the mandated benefit law to impose re-
quirements only on insurers. Therefore, it satisfied the test for the final
McCarran-Ferguson Act factor.
3
Although the Court found that the Massachusetts law was saved
from preemption, its two-step test is not a model of clarity for future
application. Not only is "common sense" an imprecise term, but the
Court did not deem any of the three factors in step two as dispositive
in this decision. The Metropolitan Life decision was an easy one be-
cause the statute in question met all three factors. The Court declined
to comment, however, on whether a law regulates insurance if it satis-
fies only one or two of the factors.
B. Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux
84
Although Metropolitan Life laid the groundwork to define the in-
surance saving clause, the Court did not explore the limits of the sav-
ing clause until 1987. In Pilot Life the Court addressed the impact of
the saving clause on those state actions that, despite having a profound
regulatory effect on insurance, were derived from general common-law
principles.
Everate Dedeaux, the plaintiff in Pilot Life, was employed by En-
tex, Inc. Entex provided employee benefits through a group insurance
policy purchased from Pilot Life. Dedeaux suffered a back injury while
at work; he claimed and received long-term disability benefits. Pilot
Life paid the claims for two years. Over the next three years, Pilot Life
alternately terminated and reinstated the payments because of several
disputes about the nature and extent of Dedeaux's disability. Finally,
Pilot Life stopped making payments on the claim."'
Dedeaux filed a diversity action seeking damages for failure to
provide benefits, infliction of emotional distress, incidental damages,
and punitive damages. Dedeaux sued under the Mississippi common-
law theories of tortious breach of contract (bad faith), breach of fiduci-
ary duty, and fraud. He did not claim relief under the Act.8
Pilot Life moved for summary judgment, which was granted by
83. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743-44 (1985).
84. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
85. Id. at 43.
86. See Note, supra note 63, at 1368 & n.194.
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the district court on the ground that ERISA preempted the action.
The United States Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the McCar-
ran-Ferguson factors, as set forth in the Metropolitan Life test, saved
the action from preemption, and that common-law remedies applied
simultaneously with federal ERISA remedies.87 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, applied the Metropolitan Life test, and reversed the
court of appeals. The Supreme Court held (1) that the common-law
actions did not satisfy the Metropolitan Life test and thus was not
saved from preemption,8 and (2) that the civil remedies provided
under ERISA were meant to be the sole remedies available to an em-
ployee to the exclusion of any state common-law remedies.8 9
After establishing that the bad faith cause of action did "relate to"
an employee benefit plan as designated by Shaw v. Delta Airlines,
Inc.,90 the Court approached the heart of the Pilot Life dispute: the
scope of the insurance saving clause. To avoid preemption, the law had
to "regulate insurance" as determined by the two-part test established
in Metropolitan Life.
The Court concluded that although the Mississippi common-law
bad faith action had been strongly identified with the insurance indus-
try, it had developed from general tort and contract law. "Common
sense" would dictate that a law did not regulate insurance within the
meaning of the Act if it was not directed specifically at insurance.9 1
As for the McCarran-Ferguson factors, the facts in Pilot Life
failed to meet all three parts of the test. First, unlike the mandated
benefits law in Metropolitan Life, the Court determined that the com-
mon-law tort of bad faith did not effect a transfer or spreading of poli-
cyholder risk.2 Second, the Court examined the effect of the state ac-
tion on the insurer-insured relationship. Although the insurer incurred
liability under the tort by breaching the policy terms,9 3 the Court
stated that this effect was "attenuated at best. ' 94 Thus, the tort failed
to affect an integral part of the relationship. Finally, the Court deter-
mined that because the bad faith action had evolved from tort and
contract law, it was directed at entities outside the insurance
business.05
Significantly, the Court did not base its holding solely on the Met-
87. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 44.
88. Id. at 47-51.
89. Id. at 52-56.
90. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
91. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 51.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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ropolitan Life test, but further determined that Congress had intended
the remedies provided by ERISA to be the sole remedies available-to
the exclusion of any existing common-law remedies: "The deliberate
care with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted and
the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue
strongly for the conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement remedies
were intended to be exclusive."9 This is significant because it provides
a type of preemption separate from section 1144 preemption. While
section 1144 preemption focuses on the nature of the state law, under
section 1132 preemption, a state law is preempted regardless of its na-
ture, as long as the Act provides a remedy.
The Court concluded that common sense and the McCarran-Fer-
guson test coupled with Congressional intent to create exclusive reme-
dies demonstrated that ERISA preempted the common-law tort of bad
faith.9 7
C. Implications
If the Supreme Court's opinion in Pilot Life mandates ERISA pre-
emption of common-law bad faith actions brought by an insured
against an insurer under an employee benefit plan, to what other
causes of action does that decision apply? Can a beneficiary still en-
force statutory bad faith actions? Can other plaintiffs (such as provid-
ers, employers, and insurers) bring common-law actions based on
outside contracts that bear some relationship to an ERISA-governed
plan? In examining Pilot Life's effect on various other state actions,
the second part of this Note will focus on the application of ERISA's
statutory provisions and case law to South Carolina insurance law,
with related comments on federal statutory and common law.
IV. IMPACT ON SOUTH CAROLINA AND FOURTH CIRCUIT LAW
A. Common-Law Actions
1. Bad Faith Refusal to Pay
Because an insured generally possesses no bargaining power or
means of protection from an insurer's unreasonable refusal of payment,
South Carolina recognizes a common-law bad faith action if an insurer
refuses to pay first-party claims.98 This tort action was adopted first by
96. Id. at 54.
97. Id. at 57.
98. See Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616
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the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina in
Robertsen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.99 Pursu-
ant to the Erie doctrine,100 the Robertsen court held that South Caro-
lina would recognize this action and that an insured could waive the
contract action and sue in tort.101
The district court's identification of the bad faith action has since
been adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court.1 0 2 Also, in Wash-
ington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc.10 3 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia adopted the rule established in
Robertsen.1 04 Washington was a pre-Pilot Life action by an insured
against a group insurer for bad faith refusal to pay medical benefits.
To prevail under South Carolina tort law and recover consequent-
ial damages, the plaintiff-insured must demonstrate bad faith or un-
reasonable action by the insurer. 105 Actual damages are not limited by
the contract. If the plaintiff can show that the insurer's actions were
"willful" or in "reckless disregard," the plaintiff-insured can also re-
cover punitive damages. 06 However, the South Carolina common-law
tort of bad faith falls squarely within the bounds of the Pilot Life
holding. Plaintiffs who want to bring such an action against ERISA-
governed plans can recover only the actual amount of the benefits
withheld by the insurer'07 and can do so only under ERISA's
provisions.
Given that South Carolina's common-law bad faith actions by in-
sureds against insurers are preempted under Pilot Life, what are the
implications for statutory bad faith actions? The South Carolina Code
outlines those insurer practices that constitute improper claim prac-
tices.108 South Carolina Code section 38-59-30 provides that if after due
(1983).
99. 464 F. Supp. 876 (D.S.C. 1979).
100. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
101. 464 F. Supp. at 883.
102. See, e.g., Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d
616 (1983) (breach of the implied covenant of good faith by an insurer's refusal to settle
renders the insurer liable in tort).
103. 585 F. Supp. 517 (D.D.C. 1984).
104. Id. at 521.
105. Nichols, 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
106. Id. The United States Supreme Court recently held that the common-law
method for assessing punitive damages is not per se unconstitutional and that an award
of punitive damages does not violate a defendant's due process rights even though the
punitive damages award may be much greater than the compensatory damages award.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988) (allows attorneys' fees under certain circumstances).
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-20 (Law. Co-op. 1989) provides that the specified prac-
tices constitute improper claim practices if done by "an insurer doing accident and
health insurance, property insurance, casualty insurance, surety insurance, marine insur-
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notice and a hearing the Commissioner of Insurance determines that
an insurer has engaged in bad faith practices as set forth in section 38-
59-20, he shall issue a cease and desist order and may impose penalties
pursuant to section 38-2-10.119 Section 38-59-40 allows a court to award
a policyholder all reasonable attorneys' fees from the insurer, plan, or
corporation. "Reasonable attorneys' fees" must be determined by the
trial judge, based upon a finding that the refusal to pay the claim was
made in bad faith.110
Because these statutes do not provide a statutory private right of
action, the insured must bring a common-law action to enforce the
statutory duty. However, any common-law action is clearly preempted
under Pilot Life. The question remains whether an insurer can invoke
ERISA preemption as a defense to the statutory penalties. The United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina addressed these
issues in Kriegal v. Equitable Life Assurance Society."' The plaintiff
Lucille Kriegal brought an action for common-law bad faith and a
claim for attorneys' fees as provided for under South Carolina Code
section 38-59-40 against Equitable Life for long-term disability benefits
under an employee benefit plan."
2
The Kriegal court held that the common-law action did not pass
Pilot Life's McCarran-Ferguson test, primarily because it did not meet
the first step which requires a spreading or transferring of policyholder
risk. The court found this portion of the three-part test to be indispen-
sable."' The Kriegal court did not address the possibility of preemp-
tion as a defense to the statutory remedies although it held that South
Carolina Code section 38-59-40 provides a remedy in addition to
ERISA's remedies provided in section 1132."
The Kriegal court's holding that South Carolina Code section 38-
ance or title insurance -business," and if committed without just cause and if performed
with sufficient frequency to constitute a general business practice.
109. These penalties are:
(1) If violator is an insurer or Health Maintenance Organization: fine of not
more than $15,000 or suspension of license or both. If violation is willful, fine
may go up to $30,000 or suspension of license or both.
(2) If violator is a person, other than an insurer or HMO: fine of not more than
$2,000 or $5,000 if violation is willful, or suspension of license or both.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-2-10 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
110. See id. § 38-59-40(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
111. No. 88-2137-3 (D.S.C. 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1905).
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id. at *9 (citing Gordon v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 668 F. Supp. 483,
489-90 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 954 (1988)).
114. Id. at *13. The second Pilot Life test established the § 1132 preemption. See
supra text accompanying note 96.
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59-40 falls within the preemption clause is consistent with the deci-
sions of other district courts ruling on the preemption of statutory bad
faith actions. Of particular note is a line of cases stemming from a 1987
California case, Roberson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.1 5 The
Roberson facts are similar to those found in Pilot Life, the most signifi-
cant difference being that in Roberson the plaintiff based his claim not
only on common-law causes of action, but also on a violation of Califor-
nia Insurance Code section 790.03(h), 118 which imposes on the insurers
a statutory duty to deal in good faith. Previous California case law al-
ready had established a private right of action under the statute.
1 17
To reach its decision in Roberson, the court applied the Pilot Life
test. Because California Insurance Code section 790.03(h) was "specifi-
cally directed" toward the insurance industry, the court found that it
satisfied the "common sense" test of Pilot Life as well as the third
factor of the McCarran-Ferguson test; the court stated that it would
strain logic to argue otherwise.11 8 The court found it "unlikely," how-
ever, that section 790.03(h) met the first and second McCarran-Fergu-
son factors based on findings that (1) it did not effectuate a spreading
of policyholder risk, and (2) the California statute did not regulate the
terms of the contract itself and thus was not integral to the insurer-
insured relationship.110 Furthermore, the Roberson court found the ex-
clusive remedies theory to be dispositive: because section 790.03(h) af-
forded remedies beyond those in ERISA, it was preempted by the
Act.
1 20
Goodrich v. General Telephone Co."1 ' conflicts with Roberson in
its interpretation of ERISA preemption of California Insurance Code
section 790.03(h). The Goodrich court agreed with the decision in Rob-
erson to the extent that section 790.03(h) satisfied the common-sense
test and the third McCarran-Ferguson factor. The Goodrich court also
found that section 709.03(h) did not effect a spreading of policyholder
risk. Contrary to Roberson, however, the court in Goodrich found that
by regulating significant aspects of insurer conduct, the statute af-
fected an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship. 22 Further-
115. 661 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
116. Id. at 418.
117. See Note, supra note 63, at 1386 n.337. Florida expressly grants a private right
of action under its statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.155(1)(a), 626.9541(1)(i) (West 1984 &
Supp. 1989).
118. Roberson, 661 F. Supp. at 422.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 424.
121. 241 Cal. Rptr. 640 (Ct. App.), vacated, 242 Cal. Rptr. 732, 746 P.2d 871 (1987).
(The case also originally appeared at 208 Cal. App. 3d 505, but has been deleted).
122. 241 Cal. Rptr. at 644-45.
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more, the court reasoned that insurance laws are "read into" insurance
contracts and become part of the terms.
123
Most significantly, the Goodrich court recognized that along with
exclusivity, Congress manifested another purpose in ERISA: deference
to state authority to regulate insurance. The court reasoned that even
though Congress intended ERISA remedies to be exclusive, that intent
was irrelevant in those cases in which the law being considered was an
insurance law that was expressly saved by the saving clause. 1"
Although the Goodrich court employed the more sound and logical
reasoning 125 because it considered all goals expressed by Congress and
gave real meaning to both the preemption and the saving clauses, that
decision was subsequently vacated. The Roberson decision, more di-
rectly in line with Pilot Life, appears to have become settled law. Rob-
erson has been followed by other federal courts. 28
When Kriegal v. Equitable Life Assurance Society is taken in con-
junction with concurring decisions from other districts as discussed
above, the provisions of section 38-59-40 of the South Carolina Code1
27
are preempted despite the legislature's apparent attempt to overcome
that outcome by the addition of subsection (4) in the 1989 amend-
ments. Subsection (4) provides that "[t]his section applies to cases
filed or removed to federal court and cases appealed in the federal
court system."'28
2. Alternative Plaintiffs
a. The Issue
The broad construction of ERISA's preemptive scope has had a
profound effect on the litigation of employee benefit plans. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that
"[t]he ERISA quicksand is fast swallowing up everything that steps in
it or near it. This morass serves as the stage for a theater of the ab-
surd."" 8 How far does this preemptive power extend? Pilot Life man-
dates the preemption of common-law actions along with statutory bad
123. Id. at 647-48 (citing Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club v. Ohio Casualty
Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 148, 373 P.2d 640, 643, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1962)).
124. Id. at 647.
125. But see Chittenden, ERISA Preemption: The Demise of Bad Faith Actions in
Group Insurance Cases, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 517, 527 (1988).
126. See, e.g., Buehler Ltd. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 1554, 1561-62 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 684 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (E.D. La. 1988).
127. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
128. Id.
129. Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
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faith actions that are brought by a party to the employee benefit plan
against a fiduciary. An issue remains about what effect Pilot Life has
on South Carolina common-law actions against nonfiduciaries that
have some connection to the plan, but arise out of conduct or contracts
that are outside of the plan. Does ERISA preemption encompass eve-
rything that it touches, however remotely? Such an unlimited bound-
ary would result in the legal absurdities to which the Alabama court
referred. Therefore, the preemptive clause must have some limits al-
though the outer boundary remains unsettled.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: Employer A hires
employee B. A provides benefits to B through a self-insured benefit
plan which is administered by insurance company C. C does not under-
write any of the insurance and C does not have any discretion over how
the benefits are paid. C merely pays B's claims according to the terms
of A's plan. Doctor D provides medical services to many individuals,
including B, who assigns the rights to his benefits to D. D then
processes claims through C. Consequently, C enters into a contract
with D to install a computer terminal in D's office so that he can enter
claims directly into C's mainframe according to C's instructions. This
arrangement increases efficiency because the workload associated with
making an individual claim is reduced. D has no discretion over pay-
ment of claims and does not participate in the actual satisfaction of
the claims. He merely enters the factual information necessary to ap-
ply for benefits under the plan according to his contract with C and
benefit assignments from B. B visits D to receive medical treatment for
a condition covered under the plan. In addition to the covered treat-
ments, D administers an experimental treatment. Experimental treat-
ment is not covered under the plan. D deliberately enters an incorrect
code into the computer, however, which indicates that all of the treat-
ment was covered. The system accepts the information and C pays the
claim. Subsequently the fraud is discovered. C brings an action against
D in a South Carolina state court charging fraud, breach of contract
terms, and bad faith. C seeks to recover not only the funds disbursed
but contractual and punitive damages as well. D seeks to remove the
case to federal court claiming ERISA preemption in an attempt to
limit damages to the actual amount of the benefits. The question
presented is whether such claims lie outside the scope of the preemp-
tion clause. The courts have taken several approaches to determine the
application of the preemption clause in similar situations. These ap-
proaches include: (1) qualifying the parameters of "relate to," (2) cate-
gorizing cases according to the remedies available, and (3) examining
congressional intent.
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b. Analysis
i. The Parameters of "Relate To"
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines'30 the Court interpreted the preemp-
tion clause very broadly and stated that a law "'relates to' an em-
ployee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a con-
nection with or reference to such a plan.' 13 1 Subsequent case law has
qualified that statement by asserting that the preemptive scope of
ERISA, while broad, is neither all-encompassing nor unlimited.'
32
In Rebaldo v. Cuomo' the trustees of an ERISA plan challenged
a section of New York's Public Health Law that prohibited hospitals
from establishing inpatient charges for self-insured employee plans
other than those charges authorized by statute. The plaintiffs argued
that the state statute precluded the plans from negotiating discount
rates.13" They also argued that because this increased the plan's cost of
business, the state law related to the plan and was preempted by
ERISA,"1 ' The court stated that this argument proved to be "alto-
gether too much"136 and reasoned that such an argument does not
withstand scrutiny: "So too, for example, do State laws and municipal
ordinances regulating zoning, health, and safety increase the opera-
tional costs of ERISA trusts, but no one could seriously argue that
they are preempted."
137
The Rebaldo court found that whether a state action is preempted
depends upon the nature of its relationship with an ERISA plan. The
court cited the Supreme Court's note in Shaw that "[s]ome state ac-
tions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or pe-
ripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the
plan." 1 8 The court concluded that this "follows as a matter of common
sense from the fact that ERISA plan members and managers are
bound to engage in myriad transactions which Congress never consid-
ered when it drafted [the ERISA preemption provisions]. 11 9 The court
130. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
131. Id. at 96-97.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 133-54.
133. 749 F.2d 133 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
134. Id. at 134.
135. Id. at 138.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1984)). See also
American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d Cir.
1983) (regulation establishing maximum commissions for life insurance salesmen fell
within saving clause).
138. Rebaldo, 749 F.2d at 138 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21).
139. Id.
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further stated that a state law which "incidentally touches pension
plans through its effect on individuals" 140 is not preempted, nor does
"the mere fact that the statute has some economic impact on the
plan"141 require preemption.
These ideas are echoed in Quigley v. Unum Life Insurance Co.,
142
a decision in which the court characterized the state contract action at
issue as being so tenuously related to a plan as to avoid preemption.1 43
The Quigley court cited, as did the Rebaldo court, the Supreme
Court's proposition in Shaw that some state actions are simply too re-
mote to be related to an employee benefit plan.1
44
Courts have also attempted to limit the scope of "relate to" by
distinguishing the conduct or events from which the cause of action
arises from the type of damages sought. In many of the cases that find
preemption of a state action, the action arose from an alleged wrongful
termination or denial of benefits.
In Boren v. N.L. Industries14" an employee who had been placed
on his employer's long-term disability program sought to recover under
state law theories when his disability benefits were terminated. Be-
cause Boren's benefits had originally been paid as a result of a settle-
ment agreement rather than under the terms of the plan, Boren argued
that the court should "carve a narrow exception to that all-encompass-
ing entity known as ERISA.'" The court refused to do so, stating that
the plaintiff was actually "relying on state law to advance his com-
plaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated. As such, the
law relates to the plan. '147 In other words, his action actually arose out
of a denial of benefits.
In Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp.148 the court held that the plaintiff's
claims were preempted to the extent that they arose out of denial of
benefits under a plan.1 49 Because the claims did not involve benefits
denied under a benefit plan the plaintiff's additional claims for other
damages arising from the same tortious conduct were not pre-
140. Id.
141. Id. at 139.
142. 688 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1988), afl'd, 887 F.2d 258 (1989).
143. Id. at 82. See also Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v.
Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 1465-70 (5th Cir. 1986) (state common law of corporate
fiduciary duty benefits plan in too tenuous a manner to warrant a finding that it relates
to the plan); Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1984) (state employment dis-
crimination laws not related to benefits plan and will not be preempted by ERISA).
144. Quigley, 688 F. Supp. at 82 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21).
145. 889 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3283 (1990).
146. Id. at 1466.
147. Id.
148. 754 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985).
149. Id. at 1505.
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empted.150 The court distinguished between the claims based on
whether the claim was made to recover benefits under the plan. The
claim for damages other than benefits was not preempted despite its
'relationship to the plan.
Other courts have also attempted to more clearly define the
boundary of "relate to." Some have linked that decision to a determi-
nation of whether adjudication of the state action would require that
the court interpret or examine the plan or its terms.1 51
These judicial limitations indicate that the hypothetical action by
C against D would not relate to the plan for the purposes of preemp-
tion. Although there would be some economic effect on the plan be-
cause the plan would recover the disbursed funds, economic impact
alone is not enough to warrant preemption. C's claim does not derive
from a wrongful denial of benefits and does not allege any violation of
terms of the plan. It alleges only violation of the computer agreement.
Adjudication of the claim will not require any interpretation or exami-
nation of the plan because the terms of the plan are not in dispute.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of preemption is
that some of the damages sought by C are benefits that were paid pur-
suant to a plan. The Supreme Court addressed this argument in Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne.1 52 The Court held that "ERISA's pre-
emption provision does not refer to state laws relating to 'employee
benefits' but to state laws relating to 'employee benefit plans' ... .15
In reaching this conclusion, the Court made the following observation:
"The words 'benefit' and 'plan' are used separately throughout ERISA,
and nowhere in the statute are they treated as the equivalent of one
another. Given the basic difference between a 'benefit' and a 'plan,'
Congress's choice of language is significant in its pre-emption of only
the latter."1
Thus, in the hypothetical case, preemption would not serve any
congressional purpose. Adjudication of the state law claim would
merely decide the fate of benefits already disbursed and would not af-
fect the substantive terms or operation of the plan itself.
150. Id. at 1506.
151. See Kentucky Laborers Dist. Council Health & Welfare Fund v. Hope, 861
F.2d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 1988); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, South-
east & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221, 234 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1007 (1986).
152. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
153. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
154. Id. at 8.
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ii. A Remedies Approach
In addition to limiting the scope of "relate to," some courts have
limited the scope of preemption according to the availability of a rem-
edy under ERISA. Section 1132 provides that actions may be brought
by a plan participant or beneficiary, the Secretary of Labor, or a plan
fiduciary. Because C is not a plan participant,155 beneficiary, or the
Secretary of Labor, he must qualify as a fiduciary in order to bring an
action under ERISA. He must also show that D is a fiduciary to bring a
civil suit against D to redress violations of ERISA or terms of a plan.
1 56
Other than a "named fiduciary, ' 157 a person generally becomes a
fiduciary to a plan only by performing fiduciary functions. Section
1002(21)(a) provides that a person is a fiduciary to a plan to the extent
he performs any of three functions: (1) exercising discretionary author-
ity or control over plan management or any authority or control over
management or disposition of plan assets, (2) providing investment ad-
vice for a fee or other compensation with respect to plan assets or hav-
ing authority to do so, or (3) exercising discretionary authority or re-
sponsibility over plan administration.1 58 The Supreme Court cited this
definition in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.59
The key word in the definition of an ERISA fiduciary is "discre-
tionary." The courts have attempted to define fiduciary more clearly
by defining what conduct constitutes discretionary authority. Many
courts indicate that plan administrators comparable to C are not fidu-
ciaries. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[An ad-
ministrator] performing only claim-processing, investigatory, and re-
cordkeeping duties.., is not a fiduciary ... ."10o The Ninth Circuit
has held that "[A company which] performs only administrative func-
tions, processing claims within a framework of policies, rules, and pro-
cedures established by others [does not exercise fiduciary responsibili-
ties]." '1  A federal district court in Missouri held that an
"[administrator's] payment of health care claims pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Plan. . . does not clothe [the administrator] with discre-
tionary authority over management of plan assets or over the adminis-
tration of the plan to such an extent that [the administrator's] role was
155. See supra note 16 for definition of participant.
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988).
157. A named fidicuiary is "a fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument, or
who, pursuant to ... the plan, is identified as a fiduciary ... ." Id. § 1102(a)(2).
158. Id. § 1002(21)(a).
159. 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989).
160. Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987).
161. Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985).
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that of a fiduciary."162 Finally, a Federal District Court in Colorado
held that the "ability to make policy decisions outside of a pre-existing
or separate framework of policies, practices and procedures" deter-
mines ERISA fiduciary status. 6 '
In Baker v. Big Star Division of the Grand Union Co."" the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue. Baker involved an
ERISA action brought against both the Grand Union Company, an
employer with a self-insured welfare benefits plan, and Connecticut
General, the insurance company that administered the plan. The ques-
tion was whether Connecticut General, as an administrator, was a fidu-
ciary subject to ERISA jurisdiction. Grand Union argued that "since
Connecticut General has the power to make initial eligibility determi-
nations 'in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Plan,' Con-
necticut General's role [was] 'inherently discretionary.' "165 The court
rejected this argument and ruled that "Grand Union did no more than
'rent' the claims processing department of Connecticut General to re-
view claims and determine the amount payable 'in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the Plan.' "166
These cases indicate that C is not a fiduciary under ERISA. Other
cases find that a state law has been preempted, however, regardless of
the interpretation of the term "fiduciary." In Howard v. Parisian,
Inc. the Eleventh Circuit held that ERISA preempted a state law
claim against a nonfiduciary administrator of a self-funded benefit
plan. The court reasoned that "[a]llowing plan beneficiaries to assert
state law claims against non-fiduciary plan administrators for the
wrongful termination of benefits would upset the uniform regulation of
plan benefits intended by Congress.' '168 The Howard court cited the
Fifth Circuit decision in Light v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,169 which
also held that ERISA preempts claims that allege wrongful denial of
benefits against nonfiduciary administrators.170 The hypothetical case
posed above can be distinguished because C's action does not arise out
of a denial of benefits. This distinction is consistent with case law
holding that ERISA preempts actions arising out of a denial of bene-
162. Degeare v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 946, 962 (E.D. Mo. 1986),
aaf'd, 837 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1988).
163. Munoz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D. Colo. 1986).
164. 893 F.2d 288 (11th Cir. 1989).
165. Id. at 291.
166. Id. at 290.
167. 807 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1987).
168. Id. at 1565.
169. 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1986).
170. Id. at 1249.
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fits. 7 ' Furthermore, the facts of Howard and Light required the court
to interpret the plan while the hypothetical case would not.1"2
Other arguments support excluding actions against nonfiduciaries
from the scope of preemption. Although ERISA expressly regulates fi-
duciary behavior, it does not purport to regulate nonfiduciary behavior.
In Southern California Meat Cutters Union & Pension Trust Fund v.
Investors Research Co. 17 3 the Federal District Court for the Central
District of California held that a nonfiduciary who acts in concert with
an admitted ERISA fiduciary is outside the reach of ERISA preemp-
tion, and is subject to the state rules that regulate the behavior of fidu-
ciaries not governed by ERISA. 17 4 The court referred to the reasoning
in Munoz v. Prudential Insurance Co., 17 5 in which the court stated:
I do not find it to be Congress' intent to pre-empt state common law
liabilities where there is no federal regulation to fill the void. In this
vein, the state common law invoked by plaintiff does not denigrate
the objectives of ERISA because regulation of non-fiduciary conduct
is not an ERISA objective.
17 8
Another problem that arises when nonfiduciaries are held subject
to ERISA provisions is the lack of an express standard of care. A fed-
eral court in Alabama addressed this issue in Jordan v. Reliable Life
Insurance Co.1 7 7 The court reviewed other cases and then stated:
[T]hese courts [that have deemed nonfiduciary behavior subject to
ERISA] have also presumed that the regulation for nonfiduciary mis-
conduct would be the same as that for fiduciary misconduct.. . . Fur-
thermore, this court can find no indication that Congress intended to
regulate only certain nonfiduciary behavior while not expressly pro-
viding a remedy for any nonfiduciary misconduct.
178
To bring an action under ERISA, a party must be able to qualify
under the civil action provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1132. If C does not
qualify as a fiduciary, he would have no remedy under ERISA. There-
fore, because the Act does not provide regulation or remedy for the
conduct of nonfiduciaries, state actions that arise out of that conduct
should not be preempted. This theory is consistent with comparisons
that note a parallel between ERISA's preemption clause and section
171. See supra text accompanying notes 145-50.
172. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
173. 687 F. Supp. 506 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
174. Id. at 509-10.
175. 633 F. Supp. 564 (D. Colo. 1986).
176. Id. at 571.
177. 694 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
178. Id. at 829-30 (citing Investors Research, 687 F. Supp. at 509-10).
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301 of the LMRA.17 The Supreme Court's section 301 preemption doc-
trine preempts state law actions by unionized employees whose actions
are regulated by the LMRA. However, this doctrine does not allow pre-
emption of state remedies for nonunion employees whose actions are
not regulated by the Act.280 This theory garners further support from
the premise that under section 301, "state claims not requiring inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement are not preempted."1 81
Based on the Act's definition of a fiduciary, its lack of nonfiduciary
regulations or remedies, and lack of federal law concerning the compa-
rable provision of LMRA section 301, ERISA's preemptive clause
should not preclude an action like the one posed in the hypothetical.
iii. Congressional Intent
One additional element to consider is Congressional intent. The
Supreme Court in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne 82 noted that "in
any preemption analysis, 'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone.' "183 As applied to the hypothetical case posed above, this
analysis requires examination of Congressional intent regarding the
Act in general as well as the preemption clause specifically. The Fort
Halifax Court recognized Congressional intent to provide for disclo-
sures and safeguards concerning employee benefit plans."" Congress
intended to prevent abuses of responsibility by requiring disclosures
and setting fiduciary standards.1 85 To further this purpose, the drafters
included a strong preemption clause to eliminate conflicting and incon-
sistent state and local regulations.188 As the Court noted in Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines,1 87 ERISA preemption was designed so that employers
would not have to administer their plans differently in different
states.188 In the hypothetical, C's action does not interfere with con-
gressional purposes. As the District Court stated in Quigley v. Unum
Life Insurance Co.:188 "Litigation of these issues will not, in effect, re-
sult in state regulation of the pension plans contrary to the purposes of
179. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54-56 (1987).
180. D. Nolan, Federal Preemption of State Law Claims, IV-7 (unpublished outline
by Dennis R. Nolan, Webster Professor of Labor Law, University of South Carolina).
181. Id. at IV-5 (emphasis added).
182. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
183. Id. at 8 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747
(1985)).
184. Id. at 15.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 9.
187. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
188. Id. at 105.
189. 688 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1988), afi'd, 887 F.2d 258 (1st Cir. 1989).
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ERISA."19 0 State regulation of the contract between C and D will
neither alter the requirements of parties to the plan nor force a differ-
ent administration in different states.
Preemption of the hypothetical case would be inconsistent with
case and statutory law concerning the meaning of "relate to," the rem-
edies and regulations found in the Act, and congressional intent. The
more consistent and better-reasoned outcome is to allow the action to
be adjudicated under state law.
iv. South Carolina and the Fourth Circuit
Although an analysis of the foregoing decisions indicates that the
courts in those circuits would not find the hypothetical state action
preempted, it is not clear what the law is in South Carolina and the
Fourth Circuit. Several decisions have dealt with issues touched on by
the hypothetical case. These opinions shed some light on how a South
Carolina or Fourth Circuit court might rule in such a situation.
In Baker Hospital v. Isaac'9' a hospital provided care to a benefi-
ciary of an ERISA-governed plan after both the hospital and an official
representative of the plan assured the beneficiary that he was covered.
The plan later refused to pay the claim and the hospital sued the bene-
ficiary, the insurer, and the employer. The claims were state common-
law claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligence, and
misrepresentation. 92 Although ERISA does not provide any remedy
for a provider, the South Carolina Supreme Court nevertheless held
that ERISA preempted the state law actions. 193 The court based this
finding on the Pilot Life rule that common-law actions that relate to
employee benefit plans are preempted. 9'
On its face, this seems to indicate that a South Carolina court
would deem the common-law actions in the hypothetical to be pre-
empted despite the lack of an express remedy under ERISA. However,
Baker is distinguishable from the hypothetical. The Baker court, al-
though it did not explain its reasoning in great detail, did reveal that
its decision followed the Michigan Court of Appeals holding in Provi-
dence Hospital v. National Labor Union Health & Welfare Fund.'95
The plaintiff-provider in Providence Hospital was acting as an as-
signee of plan participants. ERISA provides a remedy for plan partici-
190. Id. at 83.
191. 301 S.C. 248, 391 S.E.2d 549 (1990).
192. Id. at 249, 391 S.E.2d at 550.
193. Id. at 250-51, 391 S.E.2d at 550-51.
194. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987).
195. 162 Mich. App. 191, 412 N.W.2d 690 (1987).
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pants. Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) permits plan participants
to sue for benefits due under the plan. The Providence Hospital court
found that the plaintiff's claim could be based upon the civil enforce-
ment provisions of ERISA,198 and therefore determined that the bene-
ficiary's remedy was available under ERISA. Assuming that the South
Carolina court intended to adopt this reasoning, the hypothetical case
could be distinguished because C is not asserting any right protected
under ERISA.
Although ERISA's preemptive scope has been broadly construed,
Fourth Circuit decisions indicate that it is not without limitation. In
Pizlo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.21 the court marked the outer boundary
of preemption. State actions do not relate to the plan for purposes of
preemption, even though damages might be measured in part by plan
benefits lost, if (1) the claims do not subject the employer to conflicting
obligations or variable standards of recovery; (2) the claims would not
determine the payment of any benefits; (3) the claims would not di-
rectly affect administration of benefits under the plan; or (4) the plan
itself would not be liable and its administrators would not be burdened
in any way by a damage award.91 Using this standard, the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that state action for wrongful termination was not pre-
empted. 199 The first requirement is consistent with Congressional in-
tent.20 0 C's hypothetical action will not interfere with Congressional
intent to provide uniform obligations and standards for benefit plans.
The other three requirements follow the "relate to" limitations
adopted by other circuits. 20 1 Again, C's hypothetical action seems to lie
outside this boundary.
In a later Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dis-
trict 17, UMW °2 the court held that the "other appropriate equitable
relief" provision of 29 U.S.C. § 502(a)(3) did not create a federal com-
mon-law action for a plan seeking to recover damages that stem from
some source outside the benefits contract.2 0 3 This interpretation sup-
ports the contention that the hypothetical case, which arises out of a
contractual relationship outside of the benefits contract, would not be
preempted.
196. Id. at 196, 412 N.W.2d at 692.
197. 884 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1989).
198. Id. at 120-21.
199. Cf. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990) (state action for
wrongful termination "relates to" a plan for preemption purposes if the main question is
the employer's alleged desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 182-90.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 130-54.
202. 897 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1990).
203. Id. at 152-53.
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In contrast to U.S. Steel, the Fourth Circuit later found that
under the facts of Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Wal-
ler204 a federal common-law action of unjust enrichment was available
to a plan seeking to recover benefits. 20 5 An insurance company, acting
as an administrator, brought a common-law action of unjust enrich-
ment against a plan beneficiary. The beneficiary had been injured in an
accident caused by a third party. The plan advanced medical expenses
with the stipulation that the advance be subrogated to any amounts
recovered from the third party. When the beneficiary recovered from
the third party, she refused to refund the plan, claiming that the terms
violated a Virginia antisubrogation statute. She also claimed that
ERISA did not provide a federal cause of action for plan administra-
tors and, therefore, the federal court did not have jurisdiction under
ERISA.
20
The court conceded it did not have federal jurisdiction under 29
U.S.C. section 1132(a)(1)(B). Nevertheless, it claimed jurisdiction
under the federal question provision and addressed the plaintiff's
claims.207 Jurisdiction was based on the facts that "demonstrate[d] the
existence of a substantial federal question." 208 The court also stated
that the state antisubrogation action was preempted in favor of a fed-
eral common-law remedy because such a remedy would support the
clear intent of the plan documents. The hypothetical case posed above,
however, is distinguishable. The Provident Life court decided to in-
voke this federal common-law jurisdiction to protect issues of "central
concern" to the Act.20 9 Furthermore, the court in Provident Life inter-
preted the subrogation terms of the plan. In contrast, the outside con-
tracts at issue in the hypothetical case are not of central concern to the
Act, and C's claims do not require the court to interpret plan terms.
One commentator has suggested the following reconciliation of
U.S. Steel and Provident Life:
If an injury or claim arises out of some source external to the em-
ployee benefit plan itself, then the remedies are found in state law
and the proper forum is the state court. By contrast, if the injury or
claim determines the relationship between the plan and a participant
or beneficiary and derives from the language and intent of the plan,
then a remedy will be created under federal common law. That rem-
204. 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990).
205. Id. at 993-94.
206. Id. at 986-87.
207. Id. at 987-88.
208. Id. at 988.
209. Id. at 991 (interpreting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) and Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983)).
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edy will then become the plaintiff's exclusive remedy.21 0
This reconciliation would support the contention that the hypothetical
action, which arises out of a contract outside the benefits plan, would
not be preempted.
B. Statutory Provisions
Having examined the preemption of state common-law actions,
this Note now examines the effect of Pilot Life on some specific South
Carolina statutory provisions.
1. Continuation of Coverage
The South Carolina Code provides that any employee or member
insured under a group policy for a minimum of six months is entitled
to a continuation of coverage if his coverage under the plan has been
terminated for any reason other than nonpayment of the required con-
tribution.211 This extended coverage continues for the fractional policy
month that remains at termination plus six additional policy
months.
212
Although the statute expressly 'excludes employees or members
who qualify for longer coverage under federal law, the scope of the
South Carolina statute is broader than the continuation provisions of
ERISA. For example, ERISA's continuation of coverage provisions do
not apply to employers with fewer than twenty employees. 213 These
small groups would be covered by South Carolina Code section 38-71-
770. Thus, if South Carolina Code section 38-71-770 provides remedies
beyond those provided by ERISA, does the Act preempt the Code? To
answer this, ERISA's continuing coverage provisions must be
examined.
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (CO-
BRA)2"" contains the continuation provisions that apply to ERISA-
governed plans. COBRA provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
210. V. Vroegop, New Thoughts on the Scope of ERISA (Sept. 26, 1990) (unpub-
lished commentary by Virginia Vroegop, Esquire, Sinkler & Boyd, P.A., Columbia, S.C.).
211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-770 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
212. Id. Section 38-71-770 as amended increased the period of time that an em-
ployee or member may continue coverage under the group policy following termination.
The mandatory conversion privilege previously contained in the statute has been elimi-
nated. See S.C. DEP'T OF INS., BULLETIN No. 11-90.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (1988).
214. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 82 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988)).
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A. A qualified beneficiary covered under an employer's group health
plan who has a qualifying event may elect to continue that health
coverage for up to 18 or 36 months.
1. Qualified beneficiaries are employees and their spouses and
dependents, if covered under the employer's plan.
2. A qualifying event is any of the following, if it causes the indi-
vidual to lose coverage under the employer's plan:
(a) the employee's termination of employment (including
retirement), except for gross misconduct, or reduction in
hours;
(b) the employee's becoming entitled to Medicare;
(c) the death of the employee;
(d) the divorce or legal separation of the employee and
spouse; and
(e) a dependent losing dependency status (e.g., by mar-
rying or reaching the age of majority).
B. If the qualifying event is termination of employment or reduction
in hours, COBRA eligibility may last for up to 18 months; for any of
the other events, the maximum period of eligibility is 36 months. If
there is a termination of service or reduction in hours, followed by one
of the other events, maximum eligibility is extended to 36 months
from the date of the original event, for qualified beneficiaries other
than the employee.
C. The qualified beneficiary can be required to pay for the coverage.
The rate cannot exceed 102% of the cost to the plan of providing the
benefit.
D. COBRA eligibility can terminate before the maximum 18- or 36-
month period if:
1. the individual becomes covered under another employer's
group health plan, as an employee or the spouse or dependent of
an employee;
2. the individual becomes entitled to Medicare;
3. the employer terminates all of its group health plans, or
4. the individual fails to pay the-COBRA premium when due.
For this purpose the plan must offer a grace period that is the
longest of:
(a) 30 days, or
(b) the grace period allowed for active employees, or
(c) the grace period allowed the employer under an insur-
ance or similar contract.2115
To illustrate the conflict between the COBRA provisions and
South Carolina Code section 38-71-770, consider the following hypo-
215. Mazo, Continuation of Health Coverage Provisions of COBRA, ERISA BASICS:
A Two-PART PRIMER ON ERISA IssuEs, Part I (1988); An ABA Satellite Seminar Tele-
cast (ABA 1988) (summarizing COBRA provisions).
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thetical situation. Suppose that A, a South Carolina employer, provides
a welfare benefits plan for its nineteen employees. This plan is estab-
lished and maintained by A for the exclusive benefit of A's employees
and otherwise qualifies as an ERISA-governed plan. Suppose further
that employee B's coverage is now terminated for a reason other than
nonpayment of premiums. Assume that B's coverage has been in effect
for the last eight months. Because COBRA expressly excludes plans
maintained by an employer with fewer than twenty employees,m6 B has
no protection under COBRA. B is covered, however, under section 38-
71-770. The question is: Whether B can claim the six-month continued
coverage under the plan pursuant to the South Carolina statute, or
whether the ERISA remedies preempt the statute.21 7 The answer is
controlled by the interaction between the preemption, saving, and
deemer clauses.
A persuasive argument to save this statutory claim is its obvious
and direct connection to the regulation of insurance. Because it is a
part of the South Carolina Insurance Code and applies to entities act-
ing as insurers, it seems that the statute is specifically directed toward
the insurance industry. Therefore, section 38-71-770 should satisfy the
common-sense test of Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.1 8 The Su-
preme Court has also stated, however, that the statute must pass mus-
ter under the McCarran-Ferguson test.
219
The Pilot Life Court recognized three McCarran-Ferguson factors
that determine whether an industry practice is part of the business of
insurance: These are (1) whether the practice transfers or spreads poli-
cyholder risk, (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the in-
surer-insured relationship, and (3) whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance business.
2 0
South Carolina Code section 38-71-770 appears to satisfy the first
element. Often the employee or member has been terminated because
the employer has changed policies and the new policy or carrier will
not accept a high-risk member. Because the statute forces the insurer
to accept the high-risk member, the insurer will probably cover its
losses by increasing premiums for low-risk members. Hence, the stat-
ute has transferred or spread policyholder risk.
221
The second factor is whether the law affects an integral part of the
insurer-insured relationship. The McCarran-Ferguson cases demon-
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (1988).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
218. 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987).
219. Id. at 48-49.
220. Id.
221. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)(quoting
Group Life Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1979)).
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strate that a law or practice which affects this relationship is one that
addresses "the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, in-
terpretation and enforcement . . . the core of the 'business of insur-
ance.' ,,222 The Pilot Life Court stated that because the insurer in-
curred liability related to the policy terms under state law, there was at
least an attenuated effect on the insurer-insured relationship. Although
South Carolina Code section 38-71-770 does not regulate the kind of
policy that can be issued, or its interpretation or enforcement, it does
arguably affect the policy's reliability because under the statute it is
virtually impossible to terminate the contract without significant
warning.
The third factor is unquestionably met. South Carolina Code sec-
tion 38-71-770 is part of South Carolina's insurance code and applies
only to insurers.
Although the Court has not expressly stipulated which or how
many of the McCarran-Ferguson factors must be met for a state law to
qualify under the saving clause, case law indicates that in the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina the first factor
is critical.223 Because South Carolina Code section 38-71-770 appears to
meet the first and third factors, and arguably meets the second, it also
seems to meet the saving clause tests of Pilot Life. However, the Pilot
Life Court did not base its decision entirely on the mechanics of the
saving clause. The Court stated that state law is preempted if it con-
travenes the Congressional purpose in drafting the Act.224 Therefore,
ERISA would preempt section 38-71-770 if the state continuation pro-
visions contradicted ERISA's Congressional purpose. Perhaps the most
persuasive argument against preemption on the basis of Congressional
intent is that Congress drafted ERISA in part to protect employee
plans and their beneficiaries from arbitrary action and abuse by those
who control the plan. Because section 38-71-770 purports to provide a
safeguard against a specific abuse, it is consistent with Congressional
intent.
Having examined section 38-71-770 in light of the preemption and
saving clauses, it is necessary to consider the effects of the deemer
clause. The saving clause saves those state laws that regulate insur-
ance. For the purposes of the saving clause, the deemer clause specifies
that an employee benefit plan cannot be deemed to be an insurer.
Therefore, the possibility of preemption in the hypothetical case may
depend on whether the plan is self-insured. If A provides benefits to B
222. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pierno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
223. See, e.g., Kriegal v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, No. 88-2137-3 (D.S.C.
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1905, *8).
224. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52-57.
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via an insurance policy purchased from an insurer, the insurer will be
regulated by the state insurance law. However, because a self-insured
plan cannot be deemed an insurer, and the law "regulates insurance"
as long as it affects only insurers, then the same situation would have
the opposite outcome if A self-insured its benefit plan. The end result
is that employees covered under a self-insured plan would not have
access to the protection of section 38-71-770 afforded to their counter-
parts whose benefits were provided under a policy purchased from an
insurer. This result, though seemingly harsh, is consistent with con-
gressional intent in drafting the Act.225 It is also consistent with the
Supreme Court's ruling in FMC v. Holliday226 that self-funded ERISA
plans are beyond the reach of even those state laws that regulate insur-
ance and are saved from preemption.
2. Trade Practices
The South Carolina Code also regulates trade practices in the in-
surance business by determining what practices constitute unfair
methods of competition, or unfair or deceptive acts and practices. 227
Although the statute does not authorize a private cause of action,
ERISA preemption could become an issue if an insurer invoked pre-
emption as a defense to penalties sought pursuant to the statute.
As an aid in examining the issues, consider the following South
Carolina Code section. Section 38-57-60 provides that: "No person may
make a false, misleading, fraudulent, or incomplete representation or
comparison of insurance policies or insurers for the purpose of induc-
ing or intending to induce any person to lapse, forfeit, surrender, ter-
minate, retain or convert an insurance policy or to take out a policy in
another insurer.
228
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ala-
bama discussed a similar statute in Butler v. Fringe Benefits Plan,
Inc.
229
225. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
226. 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990).
227. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-57-10 to -320 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
228. Id. § 38-57-60.
229. 701 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ala. 1988). The Alabama statute entitled "Twisting"
stated:
No person shall make or issue, or cause to be made or issued, any written or
oral statement misrepresenting or making misleading incomplete comparisons
as to the terms, conditions or benefits contained in any policy for the purpose
of inducing, or attempting or tending to induce, the policyholder to lapse, for-
feit, surrender, retain, exchange or convert any insurance policy.
ALA. CODE § 27-12-16 (1977).
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To determine whether the Alabama statute was saved from pre-
emption, the Butler court compared the approaches of the Eleventh
Circuit holding in Anschultz v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co.230 and the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in Graves v. Blue Cross.231 Application of the Anschultz rea-
soning would have resulted in preemption rather than saving because
"Alabama Code § 27-12-6 would not meet the criteria for an exception
from ERISA preemption, especially since [section 27-12-6] does not
purport to transfer or spread policyholder risk. '232 The Butler court
declined to adopt the reasoning of Anschultz; rather, it favored the
Graves court's reasoning that "a California statute that prohibits cer-
tain insurance practices because they are 'unfair' and 'deceptive' is a
law 'regulating insurance' and, therefore, is not preempted by
ERISA. ' '233 The Butler court rendered this finding moot by holding
that an action under section 27-12-16 did not "relate to" a plan for
preemption purposes.2 34 The court cited the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne23 5 that some claims are so
remotely, indirectly, or peripherally related to a plan that they do not
constitute an ERISA claim.
236
Also, a South Carolina or Fourth Circuit court might look to the
Pizlo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.2 3 7 tests combined with the "central
concerns" considerations outlined in Provident Life & Accident Insur-
ance Co. v. Waller238 to determine whether the statute fell outside the
boundary of the "relate to" language of the Act.
239
If the court found that the law related to the plan for preemption
purposes, it would turn to the saving clause to determine whether the
law should be saved from preemption. Unlike the Butler court, the
Fourth Circuit probably would reject the Graves court's reasoning in
favor of the Anschultz rule. In Kriegal v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society2 0 the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina cited Anschultz to hold that a law which failed to meet the
McCarran-Ferguson factors could not be saved as one that regulates
230. 850 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1988).
231. 688 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
232. Butler, 701 F. Supp. at 806-07.
233. Id. at 807 (emphasis in original).
234. Id.
235. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
236. Butler, 701 F. Supp. at 807.
237. 884 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1989).
238. 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1990).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 196-208.
240. No. 88-2137-3 (D.S.C. 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1905).
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insurance.241
3. Exempted Statutes
Although the Act stipulates that ERISA supersedes "any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan, '24 2 certain state laws, other than those that "regulate in-
surance, banking or securities 243 are also saved. The saving clause also
saves state criminal laws,24 4 the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act,24 5
qualified domestic relations orders, 246 and state laws necessary to com-
ply with Title XIX of the Social Security Act.
24 7
Section 1144(d) also stipulates that "[n]othing in this title shall be
construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law of the United States . . .or any rule or regulation issued under
any such law. '248 This last provision would be especially persuasive
against preemption of charges under RICO, 24 9 which was already in ef-
fect when Congress enacted ERISA and was not expressly preempted.
More complicated issues arise, however, when an action involves a fed-
eral law written since ERISA's drafting that contains clauses which
contradict ERISA's preemption clause.
V. CONCLUSION
From the early Supreme Court decisions of Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc.25' and Shaw v. Delta Airlines,251 which broadly con-
strued the preemption clause, through Metropolitan Life Insurance v.
Massachusetts,252 which narrowly defined the saving clause, the pre-
emptive powers of ERISA have evolved into one of the most powerful
federal preemption clauses ever drafted. The recent trend is to limit
the boundaries of the preemption clause and to recognize the existence
of actions that should rightfully be outside its scope. In response to the
growing need for some sort of limitation, more recent federal decisions
241. Id. at *10.
242. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
243. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
244. Id. § 1144(b)(4).
245. Id. § 1144(b)(5); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 393-1 to -51 (1974).
246. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1988).
247. Id. § 1144(b)(8).
248. Id. § 1144(d).
249. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984).
250. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
251. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
252. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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have attempted to harness the preemption clause by more narrowly
defining "relate to"25 3 or by excluding from preemption those actions
that have no remedy under the Act or that arise out of sources outside
the benefits contract.2 15 More frequently, courts are using such lan-
guage as "broad, but not all-encompassing.
2 55
This limitation must be balanced, however, against Congressional
intent to reserve the area of employee benefits for federal regulation.
An underlying objective of the Act is to protect plans from the com-
plexities of conflicting state regulations. 256 By doing so, Congress hoped
to stabilize plan obligations and thus encourage employers to establish
and maintain benefit plans.
257
This Note suggests that adjudication of South Carolina actions
such as in the hypothetical example would not disturb this balance.
Such an action arises from a contract or obligation apart from the plan
itself. Although the results of the action may have an incidental eco-
nomic impact on the plan, adjudication would not affect the terms or
administration of the plan, nor would it subject the plan itself to any
conflicting state obligations. Adjudication of these state claims would
merely allow the state to retain jurisdiction over those disputes that
fall outside ERISA's jurisdiction under sections 1144 and 1132.25 8
A federal court may still retain jurisdiction over actions that in-
volve issues of central concern to the Act even though they arise out of
a contract or obligation apart from the benefits plan. In Provident Life
and Accident Insurance Co. v. Waller25 9 the court held that federal
question jurisdiction exists when "the issue in dispute is of 'central
253. See supra text accompanying notes 130-54.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 201-09.
255. Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1504 (9th Cir. 1985); Lane v. Goren, 743
F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984). See also
Quigley v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 80, 82 (D. Mass. 1988) ("Despite the ex-
pansive interpretation accorded the ERISA preemption provision, the scope of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 is not entirely unlimited.").
256. H.R 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (19.74) (Senator Williams
remarked: "[ERISA's provisions] are intended to preempt the field for Federal regula-
tions, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation
of employee benefit plans." Id.).
257. Congress also provided protection to participants and their beneficiaries by re-
quiring certain disclosures and enacting federal minimal standards concerning funding,
vesting, and termination. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
258. The Act provides that ERISA preempts all state laws which relate to a plan
except for those that fall within the saving clause of § 1144(b). Section 1132 contains the
civil remedies provisions of ERISA. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)
held that the existence of a remedy under the Act confers federal jurisdiction and
preempts state action. Id. at 52.
259. 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1990).
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concern' to the federal statute."260 Thus in those cases, the federal
courts are empowered to develop a federal common law to further the
purposes of ERISA.
This power is not without limitation. In U.S. Steel Mining Co. v.
District 17, UMW26' the court recognized that "[t]hough courts have
the power to create federal common law . . . [the courts] are con-
strained to fashion only those remedies that are appropriate and neces-
sary to effectuate the purposes of ERISA.' '262 The court also stated
that "Congress did not intend that federal courts should develop com-
mon law to decide these issues that bear at best a most attenuated
relation to the purposes of ERISA.
' '26 3
South Carolina actions such as the one in the hypothetical bear
such an attenuated relation to the plan itself that it should not bring
about federal question jurisdiction or "relate to" the plan for the pur-
poses of section 1144. Further, section 1132 of the Act provides no
remedy for such an action. Therefore, the proper forum for deciding
these questions should be the state rather than the federal courts.
Caroline Wrenn Cleveland
260. Id. at 990; see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1 (1983).
261. 897 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1990).
262. Id. at 153.
263. Id.
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